The Case of the Missing Community Property by Davis, Harvey L.
SMU Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 1
1951
The Case of the Missing Community Property
Harvey L. Davis
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Harvey L. Davis, The Case of the Missing Community Property, 5 Sw L.J. 1 (1951)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol5/iss1/1
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME V WINTER, 1951 NUMBER 1
THE CASE OF THE MISSING COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Harvey L. Davis*
A S A RESULT of the four-to-three decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Wissner v. Wissner'
a tremendous amount of wealth in the form of the wife's interest
in community property suddenly disappeared. The widow in that
case lost only her one-half interest in a matured $10,000 National
Service Life Insurance policy. But millions of wives and widows
domiciled in the original community property states2 apparently
lost their interest in such insurance under the decision. At the
very least their interest has been made subject to such complete
and unrestricted control of the insured serviceman-husband that
no semblance of a property right remains to the wife. The major-
ity opinion, written by Mr. Justice Tom Clark, from the com-
munity property state of Texas, does not say what happened to
the widow's community property interest in the earnings of her
husband that were used as premium payments to keep the insur-
ance in force. But the opinion does imply in a footnote8 that
possibly the wife never had any community property interest in
such earnings.
The decision struck a blow that is as momentous in its effect
on a wife's community property interest as the Tidelands Decision
is upon state ownership of submerged lands. Millions of dollars
worth of property in the form of National Service Life Insurance
(NSLI) and United States Government Life Insurance (USGLI)
that was believed to be vested equally in husbands and wives
*Associate Professor, School of Law, Southern Methodist University; member,
Texas and District of Columbia Bars.
1338 U. S. 655 (1950).
2 Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Wash-
ington.
3 338 U. S. at 657, n. 2.
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domiciled in the community property states has been snatched
from the wives and placed at the unrestricted disposal of the hus-
bands. The majority opinion completely disregarded traditional
and fundamental community property principles in carrying out
the present philosophy of making alleged federal interests para-
mount to all other interests. This philosophy is, of course, most
apparent in the Tidelands Decision which completely ignores
traditional state property concepts as well as solemn compacts
between sovereign entities.
1. HISTORY OF THE CASE
Margaret V. Wissner and Leonard 0. Wissner were married
in California in 1930 and were continuously domiciled there.
At that time Leonard was taking medical training, and Margaret
continued her work as a trained nurse, earning money to permit
Leonard to complete his education. Her earnings were put into
a joint account with her husband, this account being continued
until November, 1944, at which time Leonard withdrew all the
balance.
Leonard entered the United States Army in November, 1942.
After six months he caused allotment payments to his wife to be
discontinued and opened up a joint account with his mother and
father and directed his allotments to be deposited in that account.
This was a part of his effort to force Margaret to a settlement and
divorce. Leonard had been sending money to his bank with instruc-
tions to buy bonds in his and one Naomi Beiler's names. He
instructed his parents to use the funds in the new joint account
for the same purpose. Leonard also succeeded in putting his
parents into possession of, and giving them title to, an automobile
that had been purchased with community funds. All these things
were done without Margaret's knowledge or consent.
Leonard had taken out a National Service Life Insurance policy
in the sum of $10,000 and paid the premiums thereon from his
army salary. The trial court concluded, therefore, that the prem-
[Vol. 5
MISSING COMMUNITY PROPERTY
iums were paid with community funds. He named his mother
principal beneficiary and his father contingent beneficiary. Mar-
garet did not know anyone other than herself was the named
beneficiary and did not consent to the application of community
funds for payment of premiums for such a policy.
Leonard died testate in November, 1945, while a major in the
United States Army. Margaret thereafter brought action against
Leonard's parents on the grounds that during the marriage her
husband made transfers of community property to them, con-
sisting of moneys, stocks, bonds and an automobile, without her
knowledge or consent and without consideration and that as a
result she was defrauded of her community interest in such trans-
ferred assets. The trial court found the facts as alleged by Mar-
garet to be true, and the district court of appeals affirmed such
finding stating: "Furthermore, we think it is apparent that the
transfers made to defendants were not made with an intent to
repay them for moneys expended for his medical education, but
were made in order to prevent his wife from receiving them, and
to force her into a divorce and settlement to further plans which
decedent was making for his future from which she was to be
excluded."4
In a second count Margaret alleged the facts recited above con-
cerning the NSLI policy and further alleged that the defendants
had received from the proceeds of said policy installments
amounting to $882.05. She asked for a judgment for one-half of
the payments which the defendants had already received and that
the defendants be ordered to pay her amounts equal to one-half
of any proceeds received by them in the future when such amounts
were received. Such a judgment was entered by the trial court,
and it was affirmed by the district court of appeals. The California
appellate court framed the question to be: ". ..[D]id Congress
intend, by section 454a... [of the World War Veterans Relief
Act5] to provide that the proceeds of a National Service Life Insur-
4 Wissner v. Wissner, 89 Cal. App. 2d 759, 201 P. 2d 837, 840 (1949).
5 49 STAT. 609 (1935), as amended, 38 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 454a.
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ance policy, after payment of the same to a named beneficiary, are
not subject to the laws of a state governing title to property within
that state, and if it did so intend, had it the power under the Con-
stitution to so provide, and thus divest a wife in California of
property rights which under the laws of this state are community
property in which such wife has a vested interest. '
Unfortunately, the court did not clearly answer the first part
of the question. It did not directly and in unequivocal terms hold,
as the writer believes it should have held, that Congress never
intended by Section 454a or by any other section of the Act to
deprive a wife or widow of her community interest in the proceeds
of a NSLI policy after such proceeds have been paid to the named
beneficiary. Instead, the court devoted its attention to the latter
part of the question and held that if Congress had such intent to
divest a wife of her community property, it had no power to do
so under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
The court denied an application for rehearing, and the ap-
pellants (defendants) made application for hearing in the
Supreme Court of California. The office of the Attorney General
of the United States then entered the case by instructing its office
in Sacramento, California, to file an amicus curiae brief before
the Supreme Court of California in support of appellants. It is
interesting and surprising to note that the Attorney General of
the United States at this time was Mr. Tom Clark who later as a
Justice of the Supreme Court wrote the majority opinion in this
case. The Supreme Court of California denied hearing without
opinion.
The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States on the issue of the proceeds of the NSLI policy, conceding
all other issues to have been settled by the decision of the court
below.7 The Solicitor General of the United States filed an amicus
curiae brief before the Supreme Court of the United States in
6 201 P. 2d at 841, 842.
7 Appellant's Brief in the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 3.
[Vol. 5
MISSING COMMUNITY PROPERTY
support of the appellants. The grounds on which the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court was invoked was that "the state courts had
refused to apply the provisions of an act of Congress... but
instead applied conflicting state rules and held the applicable
provisions of the Congressional act void under the Fifth and Tenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States."'
As indicated above, it is doubtful that the California court did
hold any act of Congress to be void, but nevertheless Mr. Justice
Clark writing for the majority stated, "Reading the opinion below
as a decision that the federal statute was unconstitutional we noted
probable jurisdiction."9 The issues in the case were framed by
the following language contained in the opening paragraph of the
majority opinion: "We are to determine whether the California
community property law, as applied in this case, conflicts with
certain provisions of the National Service Life Insurance Act of
1940; and if so, whether the federal law is consistent with the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."'10
After framing the issues in this fashion, the Court held that a
properly designated beneficiary of a NSLI policy who was not
the spouse of the insured is nevertheless entitled to all the pro-
ceeds of the policy upon the death of the insured against any claim
thereto by the surviving spouse, despite the fact that the marriage
was in existence at the time the policy was acquired, that both
spouses were domiciled in the community property state of Cali-
fornia at all times and that the premiums were paid from the army
pay of the insured.
After the opinion of the Supreme Court was published, its
effect upon the community property interest of wives and widows
was noted with such alarm that the Attorneys General of the States
of Arizona, Texas and California, joined by Idaho and Nevada,
filed amicus curiae briefs in support of a petition for rehearing.
s Appellant's Brief in the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 2.




However, the petition was denied without opinion." The writer
appeared "Of Counsel" on the brief of the State of Texas.
2. NATIONAL SERVICE LIFE INSURANCE Is NOT BASICALLY
DIFFERENT FROM COMMERCIAL INSURANCE
The majority opinion turns upon the interpretation of Sections
80 2 (g) and 802(i) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of
194012 and Section 454a of the World War Veterans' Relief Act,
1924." Section 454 a has been made a part of the' National
Service Life Insurance Act'4 (hereinafter called the "Act"). The
Court's interpretation of these sections of the Act is such as to
indicate that NSLI is so radically different from commercial
insurance that radically different rules of law must be applied.
But this conclusion appears to be unwarranted either by the word-
ing of the sections or by the history behind the Act.
These sections are but part of the Congressional plan of setting
up an insurance program for servicemen that is not basically
different from commercial insurance. Section 454a provides an
exemption of payments of benefits from claims of creditors.
Similar statutes are in effect in all, or almost all, the states in the
Union.15 Section 8 02 (g) restricts the permitted class of bene-
ficiaries 6 and reserves to the insured the power of free designa-
tion of beneficiaries (within the permitted class) and the power
to change beneficiaries. Such reservation of powers is, of course,
permitted insureds under the laws of all the states and is common
to almost all commercial policies. Section 802(i) makes pro-
vision for payment of benefits where no beneficiary was desig-
nated or where the designated beneficiary has died. This section
11339 U. S. 926 (1950).
12 54 STAT. 1008 (1940), as amended, 38 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 801 et seq.
13 49 STAT. 609 (1935), as amended, 38 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 421 et seq.
14 54 STAT. 1014 (1940), 38 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 816.
15 The insurance proceeds exemption statutes of 42 states and the District of
Columbia are discussed in 2 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929) § 330.
16 This restriction was removed as to those policies maturing on or after August 1,
1946. 60 STAT. 781 (1946), 38 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 802(g).
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along with 802(j) prevents payment of installments of insurance
where the insured and all of the beneficiaries within the permitted
class have died. Neither of these two sections applies to insurance
maturing on or after August 1, 1946.17 A more detailed analysis
of these sections will be made at a later point when the majority
opinion's application of them is considered.
When the question of insurance for servicemen was first con-
sidered, hearings were held and investigation made to determine
a feasible program."8 Some consideration was given to a plan of
permitting servicemen to insure with commercial insurance com-
panies, with the government bearing the expense of the extra
premiums since the government was responsible for placing the
men in hazardous circumstances. This plan was rejected. 9 Three
theories of government insurance were available: gratuitous, com-
pulsory or contract. Contract insurance was selected as the plan.20
Therefore, the service man is not receiving a gift when he pur-
chases a USGLI or NSLI policy. True, the amounts of the pre-
miums are low; but reasons for this are apparent when it is con-
sidered that no fees or commissions are paid to insurance agents,
no fees are paid to medical examiners, there are no special invest-
ment expenses since the funds received go into government securi-
ties, and there are no taxes to be paid. The actual administration
of the insurance business is charged as a general government
expense.2'
There is no question that when a USGLI or NSLI policy is
taken out, a property right is acquired in exchange for a considera-
tion." This is, of course, true when a commercial insurance
policy is purchased. It should follow that when community funds
are used to pay the premiums of USGLI or NSLI policies, such
1760 STAT. 781 (1946), 38 U. S. C. 1946 ed. §§ 802(g), 802().
18 Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5723,
65th Cong., 1st Sess., August 17, 1917.
19 McGILL, AN ANALYsIS OF GOVERNMENT LIFE INSURANCE (1949) 6.
20 Id. at 8.
21 Id. at 6.
22 Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 (1934).
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policies become community assets. But what has happened to these
community assets under the Wissner decision? They have been
turned over to the husband, and he has been given title to property
that rightfully belongs to the wife.
Both USGLI and NSLI can be converted into permanent insur-
ance for which standard forms, duplicated by practically all com-
mercial life insurance companies, are used.2". These standard
forms are the basis of the contract between the government and
the serviceman, and since they are duplicates of the forms used
by commercial life insurance companies, it must follow that
government insurance is basically the same as commercial insur-
ance.
Contrary to the implication in the majority opinion that NSLI
is a windfall produced by a paternal government is the fact that
husbands and wives in the community property states have been
paying premiums on such policies out of community property
earnings for over 30 years. At the time of enactment of the Selec-
tive Training and Service Act of 1940 there were in force over
600,000 USGLI policies issued during and after World War I.
These were both converted and yearly renewable term policies
representing more than $2,500,000,000 of insurance.24 Five mil-
lion veterans of World War II are maintaining in force NSLI
policies with face value of $31,200,000,000,25 and the number of
23 "All insurance issued during World War I was on the one-year renewable term
basis, whereas all NSLI was originally issued as five-year term policies, convertible
into ordinary life, twenty-payment life, or thirty-payment life policies. Now, however,
NSLI is obtainable in the following permanent forms: ordinary life, twenty-payment
life, thirty-payment life, twenty-year endowment, endowment at age 60, and endowment
at age 65. United States Government Life Insurance offers the same life policies, in
addition to a five-year convertible and renewable term policy, and the following endow-
ment forms: twenty-year endowment, thirty-year endowment, and endowment at age 62.
"These are standard forms and, with the exception of the endowment at age 62, are
duplicated by practically all commercial life insuramce companies. Commercial com-
panies go further, however, and offer additional plans designed to meet in a more
efficacious manner the needs of the policyholders and to improve the competitive
position of the company. Typical of the latter are family income policies and retirement
income plans. Government life insurance does not purport to furnish such specialized
protection but confines itself to basic forms of universal application!' McGill, op. cit.
supra note 19, at 264.24 ADMINISTRATION OF VETERANS AFFAiRS, ANNUAL REPORT (1941) 22.
25 McGill, op cit. supra note 19 at 226.
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married couples in community property states who are paying
premiums on these policies from privately earned community
funds must number in the hundreds of thousands.
3. A BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM
Is LIMITATION OF RIGHT OF HUSBAND To MANAGE, CONTROL
OR DISPOSE OF WIFE'S INTEREST IN COMMUNITY
A basic principle of the community property system is the
imposition of some limitations on the right and power of the
husband to manage, control or dispose of the wife's interest in
the community.26 This principle is inherent in the system because
the wife is a co-owner of the community property. 27 It is the
simple proposition that the husband cannot treat his wife's prop-
erty as his own because it is not his own.
A difficult problem in life insurance cases is the determination
of the limitations on the husband's donative power when he seeks
to give away community property by means of life insurance. All
of the original community property states impose some limita-
tions. 2' These limitations range from permitting the husband to
give away community property unless he intends to defraud or
injure the wife,29 to denial of power to give away the community
without the wife's consent."0 In California, where the Wissner
case arose, the husband cannot give away his wife's interest in the
community without her consent in writing."'
26 The husband has the authority to manage, control and dispose of the community.
3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1935) 218.
27 Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U. S. 340, 348 (1945) ; La Tourette v. La Tourette,
15 Ariz, 200, 137 Pac. 426 (1914) ; King v. Morris, 1 S. W. 2d 605 (Tex. Comm. App.
1928); see Daggett, The Modern Problem of the Nature of the Wife's Interest in
Community Property-A Comparative Study, 19 Calif. L. Rev. 567 (1931). .
28 See Huie, Community Property Laws as Applied to Life Insurance, 18 Tex. L.
Rev. 121 (1940).
29 Aaron v. Aaron, 173 S. W. 2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) er ref. w. o. m.; Moore
v. California-Western States Life Insurance Co., 67 S. W. 2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934) er. denied.
80 Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wash. 2d 176, 177 P. 2d 391 (1947) ; King v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 13 Wash. 2d 414, 125 P. 2d 282 (1942) ; Occidental Life Insurance
Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P. 2d 27 (1937).
31 Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P. 2d 841 (1945) ; Fields v. Fields, 178
F. 2d 200 (C. C. A. 9th, 1949).
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Emphasis should be made of the vast difference between the
civil law concept of marriage as a partnership and the common
law concept of marriage as vesting in the husband all common
property as well as making him the sole legal entity. Under the
partnership concept all property possessed by the husband and
wife is presumed to be common property, owned equally by each,
with the husband as the managing partner. This system, inextric-
ably woven into the whole fabric of the community property
states' life and law, has had no need of fundamental changes to
adapt it to the present day requirements of husbands and wives.
By contrast, it has been only by statutory enactments that married
women in most common law jurisdictions have been permitted
rights in their own property.
The sharp difference in the two basic concepts of ownership of
property acquired after marriage is exemplified by Willcox v.
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2 wherein the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania declared that State's Community Property Law of 1947
to be unconstitutional under both the Constitution of Pennsylvania
and the Federal Constitution. The court there considered a statute
purporting to superimpose a community property system upon a
state property structure where common law rules and principles
with respect to property held by and between husband and wife
had been traditionally followed. The court received the benefit
of profound research by many of the more prominent attorneys of
Pennsylvania on the basic differences between the two marital con-
cepts. As a result it found that the newly enacted Community
Property Law of 1947 made income and profits derived from
property owned by a spouse prior to the effective date of the law
the common property of both spouses and that therefore its effect
was to deprive the spouse of property without due process of law.
The court was careful to note that the principles laid down by
the Spanish law, and followed in the constitutions, statutes and
judicial systems of some of the traditional community property
32357 Pa. 581, 55 A. 2d 521 (1947).
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states from the very beginning of their governmental existence,
made such income and profits community property belonging to
both spouses by halves.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also found that the Commu-
nity Property Law of 1947 failed to have any limitation on the
management, control, and disposition of such community property
by the husband and that therefore the wife was not really an owner
of the property since she had none of the incidents of ownership.
The court noted by contrast the limitations imposed by the tradi-
tional community property states upon the management, control
and disposition of the community property by the husband.
This decision further emphasizes that the husband's administra-
tion of the community must be directed to the preservation and use
of it for the common benefit of himself and his wife and may not
be exercised to the latter's prejudice.
The decision in the Wissner case permits the husband to adminis-
ter community funds, in which the wife has a vested interest, to
her prejudice by using such funds to pay premiums on NSLI poli-
cies wherein some third party beneficiary may acquire complete
rights in the proceeds. It forecloses relief where heretofore the
courts have always granted such relief in favor of the wife for any
violation of the husband's duties in regard to administration, con-
trol and disposition of the communal property.33
4. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS HERETOFORE
RECOGNIZED LIMITATION OF RIGHT OF HUSBAND TO
MANAGE, CONTROL OR DISPOSE OF WIFE'S
INTEREST IN COMMUNITY
Heretofore the Supreme Court has clearly recognized the
nature and the extent of the wife's vested rights in the commu-
nity property. In Poe v. Seaborn"4 and companion cases (Goodell
33Swisher v. Swisher, 190 S. W. 2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
34 282 U. S. 101 (1930).
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v. Koch, 5 Hopkins v. Bacon, 6 Bender v. Paff,87 and United States
v. Malcolm8") decided at the same time, it was held that according
to the laws of the community property states, with which those
cases were respectively concerned, the wife had a vested interest
in the community property and not merely an expectancy. In the
case of Hopkins v. Bacon, supra, which dealt with the Texas com-
munity property laws, in considering the statutes containing pro-
visions as to what should be included in community property, the
Court stated:
"... They provide, as is usual in states having the community
system, that the husband shall have power of management and con-
trol such that he may deal with community property very much as if
it were his own. In spite of this, however, it is settled that in Texas
the wife has a present vested interest in such property. Arnold v.
Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799. Her interest is said to be
equal to the husband's. Wright v. Hays, 10 Tex. 130, 60 Am. Dec.
200. It is held that the spouses' rights of property in the effects of the
community are perfectly equivalent to each other. Arnold v. Leonard,
supra. These expressions as to the wife's interest are confirmed by
the authorities holding that if the husband, as agent of the com-
munity, acts in fraud of the wife's rights, she is not without remedy
in the courts. Stramler v. Coe, 15 Tex. 211; Martin v. Moran, 11 Tex.
Civ. App. 509, 32 S. W. 904; Watson v. Harris, 61 Tex. Civ. App.
263, 130 S. W. 237; Davis v. Davis (Tex. Civ. App.) 186 S. W.
775."89
The rationale of these cases, decided after profound research
and submission of briefs and arguments by a large number of
prominent attorneys from many parts of this nation, is that the
wife has a vested interest in the community property because:
"While the husband has the management and control of commu-
nity personal property and like power of disposition thereof as
of his separate personal property, this power is subject to restric-
35282 U. S. 118 (1930).
86 282 U. S. 122 (1930).
87282 U. S. 127 (1930).
38282 U. S. 792 (1930).
89 282 U. S. at 126.
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tions which are inconsistent with denial of the wife's interest as
co-owner."
' 40
5. THE WISSNER DECISION DOES VIOLENCE TO THE COMMUNITY
PROPERTY SYSTEM IN THAT IT PERMITS A HUSBAND
UNLIMITED POWER IN THE MANAGEMENT, CONTROL
AND DISPOSITION OF THE WIFE'S INTEREST
IN THE COMMUNITY ESTATE
As has been noted, all of the community property states im-
pose some limitations upon the power of the husband to deal with
the wife's interest in the community.41 With the exception of
Louisiana, the limitations imposed by Texas are the least strin-
gent. The Texas law permits the husband to give away personal
community property as long as he has no intent to defraud the
wife.42 The meaning of "intent to defraud" has not been clearly
enunciated either in Texas48 or in those states that require a show-
ing of fraud.44 The comments that follow concerning the Texas
law are also applicable in general to the other community prop-
erty states.
While the facts in the Wissner case may be sufficient to show
legal fraud in Texas,4" there is no reason to believe that the United
States Supreme Court would not reach the same conclusion in a
case where "intent to defraud" was clearly shown.
Where the husband uses community funds for the payment of
premiums on a policy on his life with the fraudulent intent of
depriving the wife of her share in the community, the cases clearly
recognize the wife's property rights in the fund used for payment
of premiums, the wrong done to her rights by the husband's
40 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 110 (1930).
41 See notes 28, 29 and 30 supra and accompanying text.
42 Cases cited supra note 29.
43 Huie, Community Property Laws as Applied to Life Insurance, 18 Tex. L. Rev.
121, 126-139 (1940).
44 Id. at 126, n. 22a.
45 See Mahoney v. Snyder, 93 S. W. 2d 1219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Watson v.
Harris, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 263, 130 S. W. 237 (1910).
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fraudulent act, and allow recovery measured by a part or all of
the proceeds of the policy.46
It is clear that the wife, having a vested interest in the com-
munity funds used for payment of premiums, acquires by muta-
tions47 a vested interest in the policy and that a fraudulent intent
to deprive the wife of her vested interest in the policy gives her
the right to recover an amount at least equal to one-half the pro-
ceeds. Under the Texas view the wife does not and cannot acquire
a vested interest in the proceeds (death benefits) as such of even a
non-governmental policy matured by death of the insured where
a third person is properly named beneficiary.4" The insured has
the contractual right and power to designate the person of his
choice as beneficiary, and the insurer can safely rely upon such
designation.49 The insured has such right and power under the
National Service Life Insurance Act, and the Veterans Adminis-
trator can just as safely rely upon such designation. But the deci-
sion of the Wissner case wipes out the wife's property rights in the
funds (earnings) used for the payment of premiums and the con-
sequent property rights in the policy and the right to recover one-
half of the proceeds where the husband acts in fraud of the wife.
All of these traditional and firmly settled rights are wiped out
on the basis that the implied intent of Congress was to prevent
interference with the insurance fund and the free designation of
the beneficiary by the service man. Yet these traditional com-
munal property rights may be fully respected without such inter-
ference. This is demonstrated by the fact that non-governmental
46 Cases cited supra note 29.
41 Furche v. Sailer, 8 S. W. 2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). SPEER, LAW OF MARITAL
RIGHTS IN TFuAS (3rd ed. 1929) 462, presents the point thus:
"It is not necessary to cite authorities upon a proposition so fundamental. It was
never contemplated that the community should be denied the right freely to sell or
exchange its possessions, upon pain of changing the status of the property if such
sales or exchanges were made. To what estate could it be transferred by such
a process?"
And see generally Emery, Mutations, 4 Southwestern L. J. 123 (1950).
48 Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 145 Tex. 245, 197 S. W. 2d 105 (1946).
49 TEx. Rsv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4736a.
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insurers can safely pay the designated beneficiary-freely desig-
nated by the insured.
In view of the fact that the decision in this case gives the hus-
band an unqualified power of disposal of community funds used for
the payment of premiums on governmental insurance policies, it
is necessarily contrary to the Texas cases cited, necessarily irre-
concilable with the fundamental principles of community property
law on which they rest, and necessarily in derogation and denial
of long established property rights of the wife in community funds.
Since by statute 0 in Texas the community estate is composed
of "all property acquired by either the husband or wife during
marriage, except that which is the separate property of either
one or the other," any acquisition by either spouse during mar-
riage becomes community unless it falls within the definition of
separate property.51 Separate property is limited to property
acquired by gift, devise or descent and to the increase of separate
lands.52 Thus, all earnings during marriage,-salaries, wages and
business profits and any property acquired therewith-are com-
munity property; and this is true whether the acquisition is ac-
complished by the husband or by the wife. The wife's rights of
ownership in all property so acquired are in every respect equal
to those of her husband. The United States Supreme Court has
said that these rights are identical, that the husband and wife own
the estate in common, and that though the husband is the active
managing partner of the union, yet her claims to the common
property are equal to his.53
In the leading Texas case of Arnold v. Leonard54 two statutes
which had the effect of declaring that the rents and revenues of
the separate property of the wife would be her separate property
5o TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4619.
51 TElx. CONST. Art. XVI, § 15, defines the wife's separate property.
52 SPEER, LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN TsxAs (3rd ed. 1929) 436.
53 Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U. S. 122 (1930).
54 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799 (1925).
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were held to violate the provisions of the Texas Constitution5
defining the wife's separate property in that they were an attempt
to enlarge the wife's separate property. The constitution was held
to give rise to an implied prohibition against the legislative power
either to add to or withdraw from the wife's separate property.
This case has been cited and followed by many succeeding Texas
cases for the principle that the legislature cannot enlarge upon
the provisions of the state constitution and make that separate
property of the wife which otherwise would be community prop-
erty.
56
There is no constitutional definition of the husband's separate
property in Texas, and, consequently, in Stephens v. Stephens,
57
a statute making rents and revenues from the husband's separate
estate the separate property of the husband was held to be consti-
tutional. However, in Commissioner v. Wilson5" the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the said statute
relating to rents and revenues from the husband's separate estate
was unconstitutional. It was urged that since the state constitution
did not define the husband's separate estate, there was nothing to
render ineffective its statutory extension. However, the court indi-
cated that the whole course of legislation in Texas indicated a
purpose to treat husband and wife alike in fixing their separate
estates as against the community, and as the statutes were clearly
connected with and dependent upon one another, since the provi.
sion as to the wife was unconstitutional, the provision as to the
husband must also be so regarded.
These cases clearly demonstrate that the community property
system of Texas forms a pattern whereby constitutionally the
property rights of the spouses are definitely fixed and cannot be
enlarged or diminished by legislative or judicial processes. But
55 Tx. CONST. Art. XVI, § 15. A 1948 amendment provides for changes in the
community estate if accomplished pursuant to the amendment.
56Frame v. Frame, 120 Tex. 61, 36 S. W. 2d 152 (1931) ; Gohlman, L. & Co. v.
Whittle, 114 Tex. 548, 273 S. W. 808 (1925).
11 292 S. W. 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
58 76 F. 2d 766 (1935).
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the Wissner case permits the husband completely to destroy the
wife's community property interest in funds used to pay premiums
on NSLI policies. In effect, it permits him to treat as his separate
property a chose in action that was created by the use of com-
munity funds.
6. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION
If USGLI and NSLI are not basically different from commer-
cial insurance, then the community property laws do not conflict
with the Act unless Congress by special provisions in the Act
intended to abrogate the community property laws as applied to
federal insurance. Unless such intent is clearly revealed, there
was no occasion, therefore, to raise any question as to the consti-
tutionality of the Act. As will be seen, there is nothing in the Act
indicating such intent on the part of Congress. In the rather de-
tailed analysis of the opinion that follows, no comment will be
made on the latter part of the opinion holding the Act constitu-
tional except the Court's interpretation of a sentence in Section
802(i).
A. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 80 2 (g)
Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, stated that "the con-
trolling section of the Act provides that the insured 'shall have
the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the insur-
ance [within a designated class] ... and shall.., at all times have
the right to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries....' 38 U. S. C.
Sec. 802(g), 38 U.S.C.A. Sec. 802(g)."59 (Emphasis supplied.)
It takes but a moment's reflection to see that this "controlling"
section merely reserves to the insured the same powers afforded in
millions of commercial life insurance policies: the power of free
designation of the beneficiary and the power to change benefi-
ciaries. The reservation of such powers is almost universal prac-
tice in the usual life insurance forms; but it does not enable the
insured arbitrarily to divest his wife of her community interest in
59 338 U. S. at 658.
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the policy or its proceeds."° Yet, speaking of these common powers
in the very next sentence, the Court said, "Thus Congress has
spoken with force and clarity in directing that the proceeds belong
to the named beneficiary and no other." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is incomprehensible how the above-quoted section of the Act
directs "that the proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no
other." Neither the word "proceeds" nor any synonym thereof is
used. Nothing is said about the proceeds "belonging" to anyone,
much less to the "beneficiary and no other." How can Congress,
in granting the usual common reservation of powers freely to
designate or change beneficiaries be speaking "with force and
clarity" concerning the rights or interests in the fruits of a com-
munity investment?
Nowhere in the Act has Congress stated that the proceeds of
the insurance "belong to the named beneficiary and no other." In
fact, there are federal decisions that have held that the proceeds
belong to other than the named beneficiary.61
Next it is stated, "Pursuant to the congressional command, the
Government contracted to pay the insurance to the insured's
choice." This is exactly what the ordinary commercial insurance
company contracts to do. Nevertheless the conclusion is then drawn
"that the judgment of the lower court, as to one-half of the pro-
ceeds, substitutes the widow for the mother, who was the beneficiary
Congress directed shall receive the insurance money."
It was the insured, not Congress, who directed that the named
beneficiary, his mother, should receive the proceeds. There is no
doubt as to his power to direct who shall receive the proceeds as
beneficiary. The same power exists in the usual commercial policy.
It is incorrect to say that the judgment of the lower court substi-
60 Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P. 2d 27 (1937) ; Grimm v.
Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P. 2d 841 (1945) ; Fields v. Fields, 178 F. 2d 200 (C. C. A.
9th, 1949).
01 If the serviceman named as beneficiary a woman whom he believes to be his wife
but it is determined under the laws of the state where the marriage took place that she
is not his wife, she is not entitled to the proceeds. Brown v. United States, 164 F. 2d
490 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1947) ; United States v. Layton, 68 F. Supp. 247 (S. D. Fla. 1946).
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tuted the widow for the mother as beneficiary of one-half the pro-
ceeds. The widow made no claim to any rights as a beneficiary.
She claimed only her community property interest in funds al-
ready received and to be received by the mother as beneficiary.
The next statement attributes to appellee (the widow) a "dis-
covery of congressional purpose that widows in community prop-
erty states participate in the payments under the policy, contrary
to the express direction of the insured." No such discovery was
attempted or necessary to preserve the widow's community prop-
erty rights. If the Act does not disclose an intent by Congress to
change the existing law, then no change is accomplished.62 Widows
in community property states are entitled to payment measured by
their community property interest in commercial policies where
the premiums are paid with community funds.6" The Act is com-
pletely silent with respect to such community property, and no
intent by Congress to destroy the widow's rights can logically be
found.
It is next stated, "Whether directed at the very money received
from the Government or an equivalent amount, the judgment be-
low nullifies the soldier's choice and frustrates the deliberate pur-
pose of Congress." The soldier's choice of beneficiary was his
mother. No one denies that she is the named beneficiary or that she
is entitled to receive payments under the policy contract with the
government as the named beneficiary. The soldier's choice was not
nullified. But if it was the soldier's choice to defraud his wife by
giving away her community property interest in the policy without
consideration to the community and without her knowledge or con-
sent, then his "choice" rightfully should be nullified.
62 "It must be presumed that the legislators who enacted this statute were familiar
with the long-established policy of the common law, and were not unmindful of the
radical changes in the policy of centuries which such legislation as is here suggested
would bring about. Conceding it to be within the power of the legislature to make this
alteration in the law, if it saw fit to do so, nevertheless such radical and far-reaching
changes should only be wrought by language so clear and plain as to be unmistakable
evidence of the legislative intention." Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 618(1910).
6 See cases cited supra, note 60.
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The "deliberate purpose of Congress" as is deliberately set out
in Section 80 2(g) was to see that the soldier could freely desig-
nate and change beneficiaries. This purpose was not frustrated. It
could not be the "deliberate purpose of Congress," by that section
of the Act or by any other section, to allow a soldier to take his
wife's property without her consent or knowledge and use it to
purchase another piece of property (insurance policy) that inures
to the sole benefit of a third party.
The all-important fact, ignored by the majority, is that the com-
munity property law when applied to the facts of this case does
not deprive the insured of the power to select his beneficiary and
to insure that that beneficiary receive those proceeds of the policy
which the insured has the power to dispose of. Where the policy
is purchased with community funds, it is community property and
each spouse has a one-half interest in the policy as an owner. The
husband, though he has control and management, cannot give
away more than he owns, but he can give away the one-half he
does own. Surely all Congress intended in Section 802(g) was
to grant to the insured the power to designate the beneficiary to
receive as owner the proceeds arising from those funds, and only
those funds, originally owned by him or those representing his
community interest.
B. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 454a
The opinion then takes up that part of the judgment of the lower
court for amounts equal to one-half of the insurance installments
to be paid by the Government to the mother.64 It finds that the
effect is that the very payments received are to be seized and
concludes that this is in "flat conflict" with Section 454a, 65 the
exemption provision. If the widow was a creditor of either the
insured or the beneficiary, the conclusion might be valid because
Section 4 54 a is a typical exemption statute immunizing the pro-
64 338 U. S. at 659.
6549 STAT. 609 (1935), as amended, 38 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 454a.
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ceeds from attachment by the beneficiary's creditors. But she is
not a creditor. She is a co-owner of the proceeds. Every one of the
original community property states has such exemption statutes,
but they do not apply to a wife's or widow's claim of community
interest in insurance proceeds.6 The obvious reason for this is
that her claim is that of co-owner rather than creditor. It has
never been held that the wife in a community property state occu-
pies the position of a creditor with respect to community assets.
The opinion does recognize a number of cases holding that Sec-
tion 454a or similar exemption statutes do not apply to claims for
alimony or family support. What may be an attempt in the opin-
ion to distinguish these cases follows, although it must be admitted
by the writer that he does not fully understand these sentences:
"We shall not attempt to epitomize a legal system at least as ancient
as the customs of the Visigoths, but we must note that the community
property principle rests upon something more than the moral obliga-
tion of supporting spouse and children: the business relationship of
man and wife for their mutual monetary profit. See de Funiak, Com-
munity Property, § 11 (1943). Venerable and worthy as this com-
munity is, it is not, we think, as likely to justify an exception to the
congressional language as specific judicial recognition of particular
needs, in the alimony and support cases. Our view of those cases,
whatever it may be, is irrelevant here."67 (Emphasis supplied.)
The statement that the "community property principle rests
upon something more than the moral obligation of supporting
spouse and children" seems to be a favorable one for the proposi-
tion that community property interests are not within the exemp-
tion provisions. The community property principle rests upon
mutual ownership of acquisitions and gains during coverture. Con-
sequently, it seems such co-ownership by the wife justifies "an
66 ARIz. CODE ANN. (1939) §§ 24--601, 53-612; CAL. CODE Civ. Psoc. ANN.
(Deering 1946) § 690.19; Idaho Sess. Laws 1949, c. 26, amending Sess. Laws 1947,
c. 149; LA. GEN. STAT. (1939) arts. 4105, 4155; NEv. COMP. LAWS (1929) § 8844;
N. M. STAT. 1941 Ann. H 21-503, -504, -505; TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts.
4764b, 5068a; WASH. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1932) H 569. 7230-1.
6 338 U. S. at 659, 660.
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exception to the congressional language" even more so than the
alimony and support cases.
The vagueness of the language used indicates the difficulty of
drawing any distinction between the cases with reference to ali-
mony and support for the wife and this case. It is apparent that
upon divorce and separation the wife's interest in the accumulated
community property is used for her support and maintenance in
the same manner as accumulated marital property is used in com-
mon law states whose statutes provide for alimony, support and
maintenance, and division of the accumulated marital property
in the event of divorce.
The alimony and support cases cited by the Court recognize
that the exemption section does not go beyond claims of creditors
and other similar debts and that it does not cut off family rights.
'They therefore support the proposition that the wife's commu-
nity property interest, not being a creditor's claim or debt, but a
marital property claim, is not cut off by the exemption provision.
The history behind this section also indicates that Congress
never intended the exemption to extend beyond the claims of credi-
tors and other similar debts. The original exemption section"8 was
construed very narrowly by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The section then said in part: "The... insurance ... shall
not be subject to the claims of creditors of any person to whom
an award is made."
The Supreme Court in the case of Pagel v. Page169 held this
language did not give exemption beyond the insured and the
beneficiary, and, therefore, insurance funds were not exempt after
they became a part of the estate of the insured. As a result of
this decision the old Section 454 was repealed and 4 54a enacted
so as to extend the exemption to claims of creditors against the
funds when they became a part of the estate of the insured.7" This
was doing nothing more than that done by many state exemption
6843 STAT. 613 (1924), 38 U. S. C. 1934 ed. § 454.
69291 U. S. 473 (1934).
70 See In re McCormick's Estate, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 179, 185-188 (1938).
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statutes which extend exemption to insurance proceeds after they
become a part of the estate of the insured and even to property
purchased with insurance proceeds." The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has held that Section 4 54 a does not apply to property pur-
chased with insurance proceeds. 2
The language used by Congress in Section 454a reflects the
intent to protect the proceeds from "claims of creditors" only."
In order to insure that all legal procedures for enforcing "claims
of creditors" were foreclosed, there was added immediately there-
after the clause, "and shall not be liable to attachment, levy or
seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either
before or after receipt by the beneficiary." Many of the decisions
previously mentioned in connection with alimony and support
cases had been decided when Congress enacted Section 454a. In
1930 the case of United States v. Robinson74 did not use Section
454, the predecessor of 454a, to exempt the proceeds of a USGLI
policy from the community property claim of the wife. Congress
did not see fit to avoid the effect of those decisions when it enacted
454a in 1935. After 1935, state and federal courts7" held that a
wife to whom alimony was due was not a creditor within the mean-
ing of Section 454a; yet Congress did not see fit to change Section
454a when it was made a part of the National Service Life Insur-
ance Act of 1940.
C. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 802(i)
In that part of the majority opinion dealing with the question
of the constitutionality of the Act Mr. Justice Clark stated:
71 For example, see Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, 1932) §§ 569, 7230-1.
7 Carrier v. Bryant, 306 U. S. 545 (1939).
7, The pertinent portion of the section is as follows: "Payments of benefits due or to
become due shall not be assignable, and such payments made to, or on account of,
a beneficiary ... shall be exempt from taxation, shall be exempt from the claims of
creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy or seizure by or under any legal
or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary."
74 40 F. 2d 14 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
75 See In re Flanagan, 31 F. Supp. 402 (D. D. C. 1940) ; Hannah v. Hannah, 191 Ga.
134, 11 S. E. 2d 779 (1940) ; Stirgus v. Stirgus, 172 Miss. 337, 160 So. 285 (1935).
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"And since the statute which made the proceeds possible was explicit
in annoucing that the insured shall have the right to designate the re-
cipient of the insurance, and that 'No person shall have a vested right'
to those proceeds, 38 U. S. C. section 802(i), 38 U. S. C. A. section
802(i), appellee could not, in law, contemplate their capture. The fed-
eral statute establishes the fund in issue, and forestalls the existence
of any 'vested' right in the proceeds of federal insurance."' "
The quoted portion of the sentence from Section 802(i), lifted
from its context, and used in the manner set out above precludes
even the insured from having a vested right to the proceeds. Logi-
cally carrying out the meaning given to this phrase by the majority
opinion would prevent any contract rights accruing to the insured,
much less the beneficiary. This is, of course, absurd. The Supreme
Court had already decided in Lynch v. United States77 that Con-
gress did not intend to forestall the existence of any vested right
in the contract (policy) or in the proceeds. It was stated in the
Lynch case that USGLI policies are legal obligations of the same
dignity as other contracts of the United States and possess the
same legal incidents: they "are property and create vested rights.""8
A careful reading of Section 802(i) clearly reveals that Congress
did not intend that it be applied as the majority applied it in the
Wissner case.
The title of the section reads "Payment of benefits where bene-
ficiary undesignated or dead." The beneficiary was neither undes-
ignated nor dead in this case. The first sentence deals with the
manner of payment in the event no beneficiary is designated, or
in the event the beneficiary has predeceased the insured; so it
clearly does not apply to this case.
Next it is provided that the payments are conditioned upon a
beneficiary being alive to take the same. The remaining part of
this subsection reads as follows: "No person shall have a vested
right to any installment or installments of any such insurance and
76 338 U. S. at 661.
77292 U. S. 571 (1934).
78 Id. at 577.
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any installments not paid to a beneficiary during such beneficiary's
lifetime shall be paid to the beneficiary or beneficaries within the
permitted class next entitled to priority, as provided in subsection
(h) of this section."
It seems apparent from a reading of this quoted portion that
when the Congress used the words "no person shall have a vested
right," it meant them in the sense that the right to the installments
of insurance was not descendible or devisable to the heirs of the
beneficiary, as is ordinary property in which a person has a vested
right. Section 802(j) restates the same proposition in express
terms.
It appears that when Congress enacted the words, "no person
shall have a vested right to any installment or installments of any
such insurance," it used the words "vested right" in their ordinary
legal sense and that its intendment was that the rights to the install-
ments were to remain contingent or conditional. Under general
insurance law, when the insured dies, the beneficiary he has desig-
nated, if then living, acquires a vested right to the proceeds of
the policy.79
In choosing these words Congress intended merely to make an
exception in the general law relating to vested rights in beneficaries
of insurance contracts.
The very nature of a vested right entails the incidents of assign-
ability, descendibility and devisability, and Congress did not
want these incidents to inure to the beneficiary. Hence it pro-
vided, in the next following subsection (802(j)), that no benefits
shall be paid to an heir or personal representative of a beneficiary,
and further, that if no person in the permitted class (802(h)) sur-
vives to take the benefits, then no installments shall be paid. This
seems to mean that if an insured dies having designated as bene-
ficiary a person or persons referred to in Section 802(h), and if
the designated beneficiary and none of the other persons therein
79 Resnek v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 286 Mass. 305, 190 N. E. 603 (1934)
see, generally, 2 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (1941) 330.
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referred to survive the insured, then the government would pay
absolutely nothing under the policy.
An additional fact demonstrating that the above interpretation
of these subsections is correct and refuting the soundness of the
application made of Section 802(i) by the majority opinion is
that Congress has now made this section along with correlated
sections inapplicable to insurance maturing on or after August 1,
1946.0 As to such insurance Congress removed several restric-
tions and exceptions not found in commercial insurance. The re-
striction on the permitted class of beneficiaries was removed"l so
that now the insured can designate as beneficiary any one he
chooses just as he can in commercial insurance. And the excep-
tion to the general insurance rule that the right to installments
of insurance was not descendible or devisable was eliminated."2
Therefore, the beneficiaries of policies maturing on or after August
1, 1946, do have vested interests when the policy matures just as
do the beneficiaries of commercial policies. That this interpreta-
tion is correct is borne out by Section 802(u), amended by Act
of May 23, 1949,"3 to make it clear as to insurance maturing on
or after August 1, 1946, when the beneficiary is entitled to a lump
sum settlement but elects some other mode of settlement and dies
before receiving all the benefits, that the value of the unpaid bene-
fits shall be payable to the estate of the beneficiary. This sub-
section also provides, as in the case of commercial insurance,
that where no beneficiary is designated or the designated bene-
ficiary does not survive the insured, the commuted value of unpaid
insurance shall be paid to the estate of the insured. One special
rule is retained in that if the designated beneficiary is not entitled
to a lump sum settlement and dies before receiving all the benefits,
the commuted value of the unpaid insurance likewise shall be
paid to the estate of the insured.
80 60 STAT. 781 (1946), 38 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 802(i).
8 160 STAT. 781 (1946), 38 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 802(g).
82 60 STAT. 781 (1946), 38 U. S. C. 1946 ed. §§ 802 (i), 802(j).
83 63 STAT. 74 (1949), 38 U. S. C. 1946 ed. Supp. III, § 802(u).
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It is difficult to perceive how Sections 802(h), (i) and (j), or
the words "no person shall have a vested right," which were taken
from context, can apply to the appellee. The facts clearly indicate
that the appellee is not claiming as a beneficiary and that she is
not asserting any right against the government, as was attempted
in the case of Pack v. United States.4 That case was one with a
fact situation comparable to the Wissner case, except that there
the wife sued the United States directly. The court, after holding
that she could not bring action against the government, stated:
"The wife, in order to have the community property right adjudi-
cated, is required to resort to an independent action because litiga-
tion of the community property rights of the wife and mother is
not a determination of a claim against the United States. '8 5
Therefore, the provision against a "vested right" in Section
802(i), applying only to beneficiaries, should not be construed to
apply to a widow who is not claiming any right to the proceeds
as a beneficiary. There appears to be no justification in using the
section to prevent the widow from asserting her right as the owner
of one-half of the money used to pay for the insurance and obtain-
ing the fruits of that money in a personal action against the named
beneficiary. If the husband, upon purchasing a USGLI or NSLI
policy from the United States with '.funds belonging equally to
himself and wife, acquires a vested right to benefits contracted
for in the policy, then it seems inexorably to follow that the wife
whose money is used by the husband likewise acquires a vested
right to the benefits.
7. ARE THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATES ENTITLED TO CALL
ARMY PAY COMMUNITY PROPERTY?
Considerable concern has been voiced about the content of foot-
note Number 2 to the majority opinion, wherein it is stated: "The
view we take of this case makes it unnecessary to decide whether
84 176 F. 2d 770 (C. C. A. 9th, 1949).
85 Id. at 772.
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California is entitled to call army pay community property." If
California is not entitled to call army pay community property
and if army pay was used to pay the total amount of all premiums
on the policy involved, then under any view or system of law
the wife could not prevail. The case could have been decided
solely on this point-if California is not entitled to call army pay
community property. If the Court entertains doubt as to whether
California is entitled to call army pay community property, then
presumably the same doubt exists with respect to whether any
community property state is entitled to call army pay community
property. The reason for the expression is not at all apparent.
Traditionally, and by statute and court decision, the earnings or
acquisitions by onerous title of both the husband and wife in all
community property states have been treated as community.
This expression may be based on a footnote in the Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae to the effect that army pay
represents a gift by the government rather than earnings because
the government can compel any person to serve in its armed
services without pay!"6 Such conclusion is specious since in fact
our government did not and does not compel persons to serve
in its armed services without pay. Any serviceman would prob-
ably receive in shocked disbelief any assertion that his army pay
was a gift from his government.
Such assertion further is irreconcilable with the solicitude
exhibited toward the serviceman by the Solicitor General's brief.
86 Op. cit. supra note 19, at 23. This patronizing philosophy is certainly not present
in Sherburne's Administrator v. United States, 16 Ct. Cl. 491 (1881), wherein it is
stated:
"Pay is a fixed and direct amount given by law to persons in military service, in
consideration of and as compensation for their personal service. Allowances, as they
are now called, or emoluments, as they were formerly termed, are indirect or con-
tingent remuneration, which may or may not be earned, and which is sometimes in
the nature of compensation, and sometimes in the nature of reimbursement. Both
pay and allowances are compensation for services while in service...."
This opinion has been cited with approval many times by various federal authorities
including the Attorney General of the United States. 33 Op. Atty. Gen. 543, 549 (1923).
Even a government allotment received by a serviceman's wife is compensation to
the serviceman for services rendered to his government in time of war and therefore
community property. Sterrett v. Sterrett, 228 S. W. 2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
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It is probably unnecessary to state that it is also contrary to our
constitutional concepts of freedom.
It is extremely difficult to understand why the majority found
it necessary to insert this footnote in view of the fact that there
was no issue as to the nature of the funds. The implication that
there is an open question as to whether army pay can be called
community property raises possibilities of tremendous ramifica-
tions. NSLI policies are but a small part of the investments made
by married servicemen in community property states from their
pay. They have purchased homes, businesses, securities and other
types of property. They have commingled army pay with other
funds and income. If army pay by some mysterious process of
Federal Government red tape assumes a quality unique to ordi-
nary earnings, it seems only logical that all pay received from the
Federal Government would acquire the same status. When it is
considered that the Federal Government is the nation's greatest
employer, it may be that the Supreme Court is going to tell us
that there is a great deal less community property in existence
than we thought.
As a matter of fact the majority opinion leaves uncertain
whether NSLI policies or their proceeds are community property
or separate property. This uncertainty exists whether the prem-
iums are paid with army pay or from private earnings. The
essence of the decision is that community property principles shall
not nullify the husband's choice 7 (even though he chooses to
defraud his wife) of the beneficiary, who "shall be, during life, the
sole owner of the proceeds""8 (even though one-half of the pro-
ceeds are fruits of the wife's property). In reaching this con-
clusion the majority does not reveal whether it believes Congress
intended that the policy and its proceeds are not community
87 It is ironical to note that even in the Wissner case, if the widow should survive
the beneficiary and the contingent beneficiary, she would receive all remaining install-
ments due and payable under the policy. See 60 STAT. 781 (1946), 38 U. S. C. 1946 ed.
§ 802(h) (3) (A).
ss 338 U. S. at 660.
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property but are separate property of the husband; or that even
though the policy and its proceeds are community property,
Congress intended to deprive the wife of her interest therein
whenever such was the whim of the husband.
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
It is the opinion of the writer that the majority opinion erron-
eously and unnecessarily disrupted a large segment of the community
property system. It not only deprives wives and widows of valu-
able property rights, but it may tend to disrupt family relations.
In granting the insured the power to deprive his wife of her com-
munity interest, the majority says, "Possession of government
insurance, payable to the relative of his choice, might well directly
enhance the morale of the serviceman." 9 Surely the morale of
the serviceman does not depend upon his being able to give away
property that is not his. Surely anything that tends to unify and
cement family relations enhances the morale of the married serv-
iceman. The community property system is woven around the
family relationship and tends to preserve and protect it. Surely
there is no good reason in this situation to impose federal rules
to the detriment of local family law. The state laws have been
looked to for distribution of funds arising from government in-
surance.
90
The majority finds a "congressional mandate" to deprive the
wife or widow of property rights secured to her under state law
in its interpretation of certain subsections of Section 802. But
analysis of these subsections reveals that they merely provide the
usual features of commercial insurance, i.e., the preservation of
powers to choose beneficiaries and to change beneficiaries and
s9 Ibid.
90 When funds from a USGLI policy are paid to the administrator of an insured's
estate, they are distributed according to intestate laws of the state. Singleton v. Cheek,
284 U. S. 493 (1932). For other cases holding that state laws govern distribution of
proceeds of similar insurance see United States v. Robinson, 40 F. 2d 14 (C. C. A. 5th,
1930) ; Succession of Jones, 185 La. 377, 169 So. 440 (1936) ; United States v. Rose,
57 S. W. 2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) er. dism'd.
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the exemption of funds received by the insured and beneficiary
from the claims of creditors. It is submitted that the provisions
of the Act relied upon by the majority do not reveal such a "con-
gressional mandate" and that there is no reason to assume a con-
gressional intent to destroy these property rights of wives and
widows.
The conclusion reached by the majority is not justified by the
need for uniform administration of the Act. The Government
argued that the need for uniform administration, required by the
detailed provisions of the 1940 Act, would be frustrated in various
ways if National Service Life Insurance were distributed in ac-
cordance with community property laws of the various states.
And it was protested that if established community property
rights are recognized, the administration of the Act would be
"complicated" and that difficult legal questions would arise.91 The
bare facts of this case refute these protestations. The Government
was not involved in the case until the Veterans Administration
and the Department of Justice saw fit to jump into it. All obliga-
tions of the Government are fulfilled when the named beneficiary
is paid. The community property laws are applied to the funds
after they are paid. It was these government departments, not the
original parties to this suit, who made the administration of the
Act "complicated" and caused difficult legal questions to arise.
So it is a bit amazing to find the Solicitor General of the United
States suggesting that legal rights should be determined the easy
way and that administrative bodies and courts should be relieved
from the burden of solving difficult legal questions.
A very large segment of the population of the nation lives
under the community property system. It is a practical system of
husband and wife relationship and a salutary one. What better
proof could be found that Congress intended these policies to be
treated as are other insurance policies than the fact that Congress,
the military services, and the Veterans Administration have placed
91 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 32-35.
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great emphasis on the fact that these policies are valuable assets.
At the time of enlistment, at regular intervals during the service
career, upon discharge from the service, and by advertisement
and dissemination of information since, the serviceman and ex-
serviceman have been encouraged, persuaded and induced to
maintain his National Service Life Insurance policy and convert
it under any of the plans offered. The Congress has repeatedly
extended the provisions of law permitting such insurance to be
carried, long after the wars were over, and when the morale of
the serviceman was no problem, for he had become an ordinary
citizen again. More recently, dividends have been paid by the
Veterans Administration upon such policies upon the basis of
earnings from premiums paid. There can be little doubt in the
face of these facts that the Congress was just as concerned about
the welfare of the soldier as a soldier-citizen and in providing a
savings plan for him and his family as it was in enhancing his
morale.
It is safe to say that thousands of the citizens in community
property states have continued their government insurance, either
as term insurance or under a savings plan after conversion; and
until the decision in the instant case, no question could have
arisen but that such policies were community assets when paid
with community funds. Here again, it is inconceivable that it was
within the Congressional intent that such policies, which might
perhaps represent the total community savings, could be applied
for non-community purposes by the insured spouse with no remedy
to the other member of the community, and that the safeguards of
the community system as to this valuable property be totally
wiped out. It is to be hoped that the Court or Congress may soon
find the missing community property and restore it to the rightful
owner-the wife-partner of the serviceman.
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